Your Mind: A General or a Lawyer?

The Philosophy Bistro is a leader in the “slow thought” movement.

If you have read Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow, let me give it a plug here: it’s a fun and educational read for anyone interested in how the human mind works. Kahneman’s main innovation (in collaboration with his research partner Amos Tversky) was to show that normal human beings are vastly more irrational than was previously thought. Into the 1970s, social scientists – and not just economists – still assumed that under standard conditions, most adults acted rationally most of the time. Through a series of clever experiments, Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that this is far from the case.  Here’s one example.

Imagine that Bruce Springsteen is coming to your town. (Odds are good that this is true.) And let’s say that you consider going. You think about how much you’re willing to pay for tickets, and decide that you’d spend $20 for a seat. This is simply a quantification of your preference. You’d rather listen to “Blinding By the Light” live than have that $20 still in your pocket. That is the current value of that experience to you.

But later that day you’re listening to the radio and the station’s having a contest and giving away a free ticket to tomorrow’s Springsteen concert to the winner. You pull over (do pull over, please), call in, and give the correct answer to the question, “What are the names of all of the US state capitals west of Los Angeles, California?” (Answer at bottom of this post.) Congratulations! You’re the proud new owner of a free ticket to see Bruce. You drive right over to the stadium to pick it up.

And then you lose it. That’s what you get for having lunch at Denny’s. Those scrambles take up the whole table. You shouldn’t have had the ticket out in the first place, but it was so fun to show off. (Next time, come to the Bistro instead.) But you still want to go to the concert. And you were thinking about buying a ticket anyway. So, you check the prices again. But they’ve gone up. They must be selling out, and the venue’s trying to maximize their take as they supply dwindles. Are you willing to pay more than $20 to get your lost ticket back?

If you were a purely rational being, your answer should be, “No.” The same ticket was worth $20 to you earlier in the day. It ought to still be worth $20 to you now. But this is where what Kahneman and Tversky termed “loss aversion” comes in. The threat of losing something we already have makes us value it higher. The typical “loss premium” in their experiments came out to about 50%. That is, if you’re like most people, you would pay up to $30 to get back the ticket you lost, even though you would have only been willing to pay $20 for it to begin with.

This is a bug built into our systems, and it causes trouble. I used to see it working on space issues at colleges. Office shuffles could be maddeningly difficult because (a) professors had greater veto power than employees usually do, so you needed at least their tacit approval, and (b) that approval was hard to get because almost nobody was willing to give anything they valued up, at least easily. You could show someone her new office, which was nicer  than her current space in every way that mattered to her – including the nice windows and its location near her colleagues and the cafeteria, but just enough off the main drag to provide a little quiet. But if it was 20 square feet smaller than her old office, she likely wouldn’t want to make the trade. Time and again, these discussions would ignore all the large gains and focus almost entirely on the small loss. I occasionally became frustrated because I was sure that the person I was working with was having trouble making a decision that would make them more satisfied in the long run because it felt so bad to give anything up. Many of these situations worked out eventually. Some didn’t. That’s life with loss aversion. And though I find it easier to see in others than in myself, I know I suffer from it too.

Things are even worse than I’ve made it sound, though, according to Kahneman. I’ve just given one example of human irrationality. His book is full of dozens, which he deploys to argue that mind can be thought of as two systems, which he terms simply “system 1” and “system 2.” Because the Bistro is a Philosophical venue, I’m going to ignore Kahneman’s cautions against reifying and romanticizing these systems (What else is Philosophy for?) and call them “the intuitive self” and “the reflective self.” The intuitive self is the one that acts instantly. It’s the you that reacts to an oncoming car by steering out of the way more quickly than your more deliberative decision-making process could function. The reflective self, meanwhile, is the one that thinks situations through in detail, that focuses intently, that calculates. So far, so good.

Here’s the thing: Your reflective self thinks it’s the one in charge. As the Civil War-era saying goes, “There’s nothing so like a god on earth than a general on a battlefield,” and that’s the way the reflective you thinks about itself. And why not? It’s so good at coming up with persuasive explanations for your behavior. But that’s part of the problem, as another Kahneman experiment demonstrated. They flashed participants a series of paired pictures, which they had them rate by comparative attractiveness. (Here’s one face. Here’s another. Which one was better looking?) The participants only got a glance, so this was their intuitive self at work. After they said “The first” or “The second,” the experimenter brought the preferred picture back out and asked why it was more attractive than the other one. With the added time, the reflective selves had no problem coming up with elaborate account of all the reasons for their choices. And at first glance this looks like a moment of harmony between the two systems: the intuitive self decides, the reflective self explains. It’s a perfect division of labor.

But it’s a sham. Or at least it can be. You see, half the time the experimenters brought back out the picture the participant hadn’t selected. (That is, the participant said, “The first picture is better looking,” and the experiment pulled back out the second one.) In most instances the participant did not catch the switch. (If this seems unlikely, click here.) And in those instances they had no trouble explaining their “choice”. That’s the big finding: your reflective self can make a case for a decision you didn’t make just as easily as it can for one you did. That’s not reasoning, that’s rationalizing. The reflective you isn’t the general it thinks it is. It’s a lawyer. 

That’s what lawyers do, after all. Within certain broad boundaries, they aren’t expected to pursue the truth of the matter; they’re expected to give you the best chance to win. That’s why they say such ridiculous things sometimes. A lawyer is someone who will say, “I didn’t do it; and if I did to it, I had a very good reason.” (This is what trips up Thomas More with the jury in Wolf Hall.) Most of us have trouble being quite so mercenary about our relationship with the truth, at least in public. We expect others to expect us to say whether we did it or not, full stop. But a good defense attorney doesn’t want to make things that easy for the prosecution. His goal isn’t to uncover what happened, it’s to keep his client out of jail. And with the least bit of cover that everyday life away from courtrooms tends to provide us, that’s the approach most of us take most of the time. Unless we put the extra effort in, our natural inclination is to explain events to ourselves and others in ways that put us in the best possible light.

At least that’s what Kahneman’s work suggests. And though I don’t mean to be a complete cynic, I am inclined to agree. We’re capable of better. Often we do better. But without deliberate and skilled effort, this is our fate: to live with half the mind of a lawyer. And that’s a bit of a shame, given that we generally don’t think that much of those who have the whole thing. (Note: I kid because I love. When your father, brother, and wife are all lawyers, you hear a lot of lawyer jokes.)

Let me close with a question: Maybe your mind is neither a general nor a lawyer; so what is it?

Photo credit: Farrar, Straus and Giroux

Answer to radio call in question: Honolulu, Juneau, Olympia, Salem, Sacramento, and Carson City. (The California coast tends dramatically east around Santa Barbara, much more than your mind’s eye would probably lead you to believe. People who got the correct answer can redeem their Springsteen ticket here.)

Other Love Languages

Brando_sceptical_-_Copy - CopyA note from Brandon: The title makes it sound like this post is about Saturday Night Live’s Continental. Don’t be fooled.

If my 18 year old self knew I was writing a non-ironic post on this topic, he would smack me in the back of the head. Hard. 

Some friends were reading Gary Chapman’s The Five Love Languages and suggested it to K and me, so we gave one of the book’s quizzes a try. It asks people to compare how important five different means of expressing respect and affection are to them: gifts, attention, affirmation, help, and touch. We didn’t learn anything too surprising, (K [No, not that one] already knew, for instance, that I rarely care about gifts, even though I appreciate someone carrying enough to pick one out for me), but the exercise led to a nice discussion about what makes both of us feel loved. If you can get your family to put their smartphones down for a minute, it could provide a good way for you all to reconnect. (Oh, who am I kidding? Surely there’s an app by now. Tell them they can pick their phones back up.)

A student once asked me after class if I thought Patterson Office Tower – P.O.T. – had secretly been named in honor of Kentucky’s de facto leading crop. Examining his bloodshot eyes more closely, I asked how much pot he had had to smoke to come up with the idea. He grinned nervously then ran away. I miss Kentucky sometimes. 

One day in graduate school I was wandering the 14th floor of Patterson Office Tower trying to decide what to write my dissertation on, when the head of the department stopped me to note that one of the best things about our field was that you could study anything and call it “Philosophy.” Specifically, he noted that “You could even write about surfing and call it the Philosophy of surfing.” As he walked away I asked myself, “Does Don really want me to write about surfing? Or is this his subtle way of telling me that I’m being very undude (NSFW)?” But it was neither. He just wanted to point out that you can philosophize about anything. Even love languages. So here goes.

First, let’s talk about what makes a language. Language has two main components:  meaning and structure. Many linguists, following Noam Chomsky‘s lead, have paid greater attention to the latter, cataloging the rules for combining words into phrases and sentences that native speakers normally pick up without realizing they’re learning them, often without being able to explain them. (It was fun to sit around the Stammtisch and realize that we non-natives had an easier time spelling out the rules for which form of “the” to use in German – der, die, das, den, dem, des – even though our Germans friends could of course follow those rules more fluidly than we could. As compensation, one of those Germans had a name for a verb tense we liked to employ in Kentucky in sentences such as, “If he’d wanted to get home before midnight, he would have had to have driven his own car” – which we naturally made trickier to track by pronouncing the key phrase, “woulda haddawa.” Its official name was something like the “past pluperfect hyperbolic subjunctive,” though I still prefer to think of it as “the woulda haddawa tense.”) But although structure is essential to language as we know it, it’s still secondary to meaning. Structure is like the steel frame supporting a skyscraper. Meaning is everything that fills in that frame – even if its only a single story – to create a room where people can work and live.

The easiest way to understand what meaning is is to relate it to action. When I dig holes in the dirt, plant seeds, and water them, my actions are directed at getting plants to grow in my garden. My behavior is making a physical difference in the world. But as all social animals know, every action can also communicate. If for instance, my spouse and I have been squabbling all weekend about whether we’re each doing enough around the house, I might engage in all that gardening activity in order to demonstrate that I’m doing my part. In addition to their physical effect, then, my digging, planting, and watering also convey the meaning that I contribute to the household. All actions can have meanings. Language is distinct in minimizing physical effects in favor of maximizing the meaning it conveys. Speaking always has physical effects on the environment, including increasing the carbon dioxide in the room. But such physical effects are nearly always less significant than the meanings of our words. (That’s why when our words are particularly meaningless, others say we’re full of “hot air.” The quality of the gasses that extrude from your mouth should be the least noteworthy aspect of your speech.)

By this measure, Chapman’s categories hold up well as examples of language. Giving someone a gift or a hug doesn’t have the grammatical structure of a sentence like, “Ah, my great bundle of sweetness, it is love, love, love at sight first,” but they likely do a better job of expressing your care for the recipient. And even if these exchanges have greater physical effects than speech usually would, in most cases I would expect the meaning they convey to be more important. So I’m going to side with the author here: the examples he offers really should be considered languages of love.

But that’s not what I wanted to talk about. What really grabbed my attention was whether Chapman had captured all of the major categories of love languages. Check out that list again: gifts, attention, affirmation, help, and touch. Are those the main ways you give and receive love? A little Googling shows that at least one commenter has suggested food as an additional category, which fits nicely with the theme of the Bistro. The other option that comes to mind for me is play.

Play is so essential to my way of being in the world that I can hardly imagine life without it. I’m approaching the end of my first year living here in the Pacific Northwest, and while there is so, so much I love about this place, I’m still building my network of friends. That’s in no way a knock on the wonderful people I’ve gotten to know, who are kind, helpful, neighborly sorts all around. But very few of them want to play as much as I do. I realized this in part because I got to have coffee a couple of months ago with someone who does like to play that much. Without intending to, we immediately fell into the sort of goofy verbal sparring that I’m almost constantly engaging in by myself when I don’t have anything better to do (and often when I do). Our whole conversation was just the perfect balance of serious discussion punctuated at nearly every comma and full stop by some absurdity. I could analyze why play like this means so much to me – how it alchemically transforms both everyday and existential frustrations into sudden and enduring bursts of joy – but I don’t even think that’s the point. The point is simply that play does make me feel alive and connected in a way nothing else ever has or will. It’s my principal language of love.

So that’s the question I’ll leave you with as your after dinner mint: What’s your language of love? Don’t feel generic if Chapman captured yours. This isn’t a contest. Brando_strangley_selfsatisfiedBut whether your favorite is on his list or not, I’ll suggest that it’s a valuable and affirming thing to know about yourself.

So: What’s your real native tongue?

Photo credits: Gary Chapman, University of Kentucky

Sympathy for the Sophists

If you asked most Philosophers where Western Philosophy began, they would probably say “Ancient Athens” and leave it at that. But if you kept buzzing at them, gadfly-like, they would likely cite Socrates’s challenge to the Sophists for the hearts and minds of Athens’ youth (read: male, propertied elite) on the question of whether they should learn the Sophists’ art of winning arguments regardless of whether or not one is in the right, or instead Socratic pursuit of truth for its own sake. This is the mythic origin of the Philosopher’s creed that truth is more important than influence and other worldly goods. The unexamined life, as the say goes, is not worth living. And that  examination must be rigorous even if the rigor leads you toward denial of the world and your self. It’s a heady principle, with more than a little resonance with Christian asceticism. Socrates, too, was a martyr after all.

“Two words, fellows; two words: hemlock smoothies!”

I though about all this recently while pondering an open letter from San Jose State University’s Philosophy Department to Harvard Philosophy Professor Michael Sandel. (You can see the letter here and Dr. Sandel’s response here.) At issue is the attempt by the San Jose State to offer Sandel’s famous course on justice as a MOOC – a massive open online course. (If you don’t know what a MOOC is, you might consider it the educational equivalent of World of Warcraft. And if you don’t know what World of Warcraft is, I’m not going to corrupt your pristine worldview further here.)

This is actually a Moog synthesizer, not a MOOC. Isn’t it pretty?

The background for this case is the ongoing effort by colleges and universities to use technology to control instructional costs – an effort that has largely failed to date – and the corresponding response by faculties across the country to prevent what they see as the mechanization and de-professionalization of teaching. This letter fits neatly into the debate as it has developed to date, but is nevertheless noteworthy for being so public and for making a justice-based appeal to one of the world’s most prominent theorist of justice. That, I suspect, is why it made the Chronicle of Higher Education.

But that’s not why the letter interests me most. Instead, I’ve found myself thinking about how well it measures up to the standards of Socrates vs. those of the Sophists. Now, in Philosophical circles I’m using loaded terms here, and maybe even fighting words. The adjective “sophisticated” notwithstanding, no Philosopher wants to be compared to the Sophists. But I mean the comparison in good faith. It’s my view that the San Jose State Philosophy Department’s public protest holds up better if evaluated as a piece of political rhetoric, evaluated primarily on its persuasiveness, than if it is judged as an attempt at pursuing the truth in Socratic fashion. And I wonder if we should expect otherwise, even from Philosophers.

The letter’s argument is not by any means bad, but it does not meet the standards that I’m sure most of its authors would set for works in their field. Specifically, the authors: (1) direct their letter to Michael Sandel, but their disagreement is more properly with their university’s administration (and with similar-minded stakeholders in higher education generally), (2) don’t spend any significant time dealing with the values and interests motivating their opponents to offer this massive online class, and (3) pile their arguments on top of one another in a jumble instead of pulling each issue out for distinct consideration. Philosophically, each of these steps is a misstep, and collectively they threaten to turn the whole enterprise away from reasoning and toward rhetoric. The letter is otherwise well written. If a student majoring in another subject wrote such a piece in an upper level Philosophy class, her professor would likely praise it while noting at the end, “If you were a Philosophy major I would expect a little more from you at points.” A revised version directed toward the San Jose State administration, that dealt thoughtfully and charitably with the administration’s own words and positions, and treated each distinct issue independently would better exemplify Philosophy in practice. It might also lead the letter’s audience and authors alike to a greater understanding of this fraught moment in higher education, and even indicate some ways forward that would make effective use of new instructional technologies while preserving the aspects of the current system most professors would like to retain.

That may be setting the bar too high, but I do think that a more Philosophically rich letter than the one the San Jose Philosophy Department wrote could conceivably have such effects, bringing us at least a glimpse of the deeper truths of this situation rather than, in effect, just saying, “No!” to a perceived threat. Yet in that alternate universe, would anyone read such a letter? And would it persuade anyone who read it?  Those seem to me the relevant questions because the letter that appeared in our own universe is not only “sophisticated” in the three ways I listed, it is also highly effectively  so. By publicly targeting Michael Sandel, dismissing the motivations behind offering this MOOC, and layering their arguments one upon another in an emotionally resonant way, the department created a powerful piece of public persuasion. People are talking about it – at least as much as anyone ever talks about Philosophy departments. The bullet to bite here is this: let’s assume that this trade is necessary, and persuasiveness in this case comes at the cost of Philosophical rigor. Is the trade worth it? And how should we answer that question?

Cut to the house of a friend of a friend down in Portland, Oregon where I attended a barbecue last weekend.

Portlandia isn’t really making anything up.

At one point one of the attendees, a union organizer, told a story about being at a hotel in Washington D.C., realizing that the next hallway was full of demonstrators with, let us say, somewhat different political views from her own, along with their unattended homemade placards and signs, and being sorely tempted to engage in a little sabotage. When her six year old daughter started asking questions about this, she clarified that it’s never right to take someone else’s things without permission – “unless it’s politics,” in which case sabotage can be OK. My first thought was Philosophically smug: as a good Socrates-inflected liberal, I believe in free speech, particularly of the sort I disagree with – since, after all, that’s the only time that belief is tested (Why would I want to suppress speech I agree with?). Then I had my second thought: is that the right attitude for politics? This union organizer runs campaigns. She’s helped people. I still can’t agree with her on this issue of sabotage, but I also sympathize with the people she supports, who want decent wages and some job protections in an iffy economy, and who when faced with the choice between a little more wisdom or a little higher pay probably don’t hesitate long deciding.Go too far down this road toward political expediency and you can justify anything, which surely can’t be right. But do we really need to go all the way in the other direction, putting truth and reasoning and all that jazz ahead of persuasion and effectiveness?

I’ll answer this way: Philosophically the San Jose State Philosophy Department’s letter earns a C. I expect more from Philosophers. But politically it gets an A. I still long for the kind of analysis this group probably could write, that would honor their interests and values while also giving equal attention to the motivations of their opponents, some of whom sincerely want to provide students with good educations – and in the humanities no less – without leaving them with crippling loans. But I also know enough about how higher education makes decisions to know that no one’s waiting around for such analysis to help them make up their minds. I can long for the sort of debate Socrates would lead, but that may just not be feasible. Politics may necessarily be more like sausage-making. And the letter this Philosophy department actually wrote is pretty good sausage. If it earned a Philosophical F, I would reject it on those grounds. But it’s good enough Philosophically to pass, so I will cheer their political coup. Then I’ll root for this situation to work out well for everyone, including the students. Maybe even the orcs.

Picture credit: Jacques-Louis David, UC Santa Cruz, Portland Backyard Chicken Keepers.

A Guide to Philosophers Here at the Bistro

After Wode Toad locked him out of the building last week, Chef Robert got a little behind schedule and asked me to pick up some of the slack. He tasked me with putting together a guide to some of the Philosophers we serve here at the Bistro. Customers have been asking, for instance, what Philosopher goes best with a wine spritzer. Especially because we’re so eclectic in the ingredients we use – insisting only that our Philosophers be organic and free of blue mold – we thought this guide would be a big help. Here’s the first installment:

We especially seek out Philosophers whose heads can also be used as sundials.

  • Name: Socrates. Just Socrates.
  • Qualities: Refined and classic, with a mild hemlock aftertaste.
  • Pair with: Rationality, questioning authority, figs.

Some commentators have expressed surprise at Hegel’s fondness for metaphors involving owls. They haven’t studies this picture.

  • Name: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (in the American South he would have been called Billy Fred).
  • Qualities: Thick and hard to cut, like a well aged cheese, alleged to induce Naziism.
  • Pair with: Any counter-fascist agent, sardines.

 Portrait of Cousin It as a Young Man.

  • Name: Friedrich Nietzsche
  • Qualities: Literary styling, anti-rationalism, alleged to induce Naziism.
  • Pair with: Penicillin.

Only Charlie Chaplain could make that mustache work.

  • Name: Martin Heidegger
  • Qualities: A crisp, authentic taste. Actual Naziism – no allegations necessary.
  • Pair with: Atonement, Pepto Bismol.

  • Name: Hannah Arendt
  • Qualities: Diagnosing totalitarianism, never banal.
  • Pair with: Chateau Le Pin Pomerol 1999. (We’re usually out. Try the spritzer!)

Ah! The teeths. They burns us. 

  • Name: Joel Osteen
  • Qualities: Perky, hair can also be used as scouring pad.
  • Pair with: Prosperity gospel, brylcreem.

Putting the deep in Deepak since sometime a little after 1947.

  • Name: Deepak Choprah
  • Qualities: The warm feeling you get from a little too much wine or just before you freeze to death.
  • Pair with: Discontinued – too many customers thought they were ordering the Tupac (exactly as NSFW as you would probably expect).

Photo credits: Some Greek dude,  probably some German dude, some romantic dude – most likely a Czech or something, you gotta think some Nazi, right?, almost surely a beatnik, I’m guessing Deepak.

Kant and the Manipulative Middle Manager

My first week here at the Philosophy Bistro has gone well. I get my meals free, the witticisms are frequently both complimentary and complementary, and whenever someone complains about my service, they at least start off by saying, “Bless his heart.” My only concern is that Wode Toad was in charge of my orientation, and I have not always found his instructions easy to follow. For example, he spent about fifteen minutes explaining that I must starch my shirts so that their collars are “stiff” without being “rigid,” and I have found this a fine line to tightrope across. Still I try my best, in part because I love the work, and in part because I can tell that the management is generally beneficent even when inscrutable.

 

“What have I told you about overdoing the chlorine?”

I cover all of my first week at the bistro in more detail in my epic “Ode on a Wode Toad,” but this is not yet ready for publication. (I made the mistake of writing the first draft in Gaelic, a language that I know mainly from Scrooge McDuck cartoons, and this has complicated my translation efforts.) Rather than drilling down further into my own experience, however, the way an artist might, I would like to step back and abstract from that experience as a Philosopher would. As an aid to this abstraction, let’s consider another case.

A good friend – we will call him “Rosebud” – recently told me he had called a meeting with another manager at his workplace for the first time in several months. For a long time they met regularly, at Rosebud’s invitation, but during the crunch period of a major, year-long project he ceased to find the time. Now that things had settled down he wanted to check in again, but the other manager’s first response had been to ask in a worried tone what the meeting was about. As we talked further, I began to see that these two probably had divergent expectations about their session. Rosebud understood that he had taken the responsibility earlier for establishing a good relationship with his co-worker, he had gotten too busy to keep meeting with her, she had not taken steps to continue those meetings, and their work together had suffered some as a result. He wanted to clear the air without blaming anyone, while inviting both of them to do better in the future. The other manager, I sensed, might have taken for granted Rosebud’s early initiative to bring them together, felt ignored or abandoned when he stopped calling meetings, and decided that if there was any blame to go around, it should not go to her. This was only a guess on my part, but it seemed a good way to make sense of Rosebud’s story. When it came time for me to offer advice, I made two suggestions: (1) Forget the past and just focus on the future, and (2) Stress the positive, including giving any praise that you sincerely can. Rosebud understood how the first suggestion could reduce defensiveness and avoid the kind of deep processing that he appreciates but his co-worker might now. And he generally agreed with the second suggestion too, but worried that it would be manipulative.

Since this discussion I’ve thought a lot about management and manipulation. In my own years managing people I never really reached a settled position on this topic. In part, I blame Immanuel Kant.

Everything you say seems more erudite when you’re wearing a powdered wig.

Kant, you see, is almost without question the leading ethical thinker in the Western Philosophical tradition, certainly as judged by his reputation among contemporary Philosophers. He is the leading theorist of autonomy – the right of each individual to make their own informed decisions – and so the arch-enemy of even the most well-meaning manipulation. You must never, according to Kant, use other people as a means to your own ends, but must instead engage with respect for their innate ability to decide their own goals. Over the decade I spent in college and graduate school, I can recall only a few ethical debates where Kantian arguments did not play a significant part, and only slightly fewer where Kant did not have the last say. Individual autonomy is essential our overwhelmingly liberal culture. (I mean “liberal” in a slightly broader sense than it’s usually used, and that’s a discussion that will have to wait for another day.) And I grew to appreciate and largely adopt this position for my own. I made something like a vow to myself that I would always try to treat people as ends-in-themselves, to avoid manipulating them, even in a sincere effort to help them, and instead to give them the information they need to make their own decisions.

And then I started managing people. And then I became a (step-)parent. And I wonder what Kant would have made of either experience. I certainly don’t think there will ever be a Kantian Guide for Raising Autonomous Children, and we have yet to see a book with a title like Kantian Leadership in the Boardroom. The latter is surprising, because the still burgeoning world of business books keeps churning out management guides based on the lives of considerably less admirable figures, Attila the Hun and Genghis Khan among them. (For those in a rush, here is a brief summary of the lessons from Genghis Khan’s career: gather the nomads, make sure you’ve invented stirrups so that they can fire their arrows forward or backward while riding at a full gallop, and avoid southern China like the plague, because that’s where the plague comes from. Also, if you see someone with either of these books on their desk, walk away.) There have even been books that draw on other ethical thinkers. But Kant just does not lend himself well to such application.

It took me a while to figure out why. And while managing adults helped me learn this lesson, it’s been helping raise young twin daughters that has really let me understand: before people can hear you, they have to trust you. Kant, like most Philosophers, treats language as it consisted mainly of statements exchanged between people dispassionately contemplating the world. But that is not usually so. Take the sentence, “You could have done that better.” We can analyze its truth conditions and find that it is almost surely true. You – whoever you are – could almost surely have done that – whatever it is – better by some reasonable standard. This is the typical way Philosophers study language. But it’s not how most people, including Philosophers, actually use language most of the time. If someone you trust tells you that you could have done better, you know they have your best interests at heart and think it’s important for you to be encouraged to improve. (I make variations of this statement to my step-daughters almost daily, and increasingly they say it back.) By comparison, if someone you’ve come to see as your enemy says the same thing, you’re more likely to think they are trying to undermine you. And you may be right.

People warned me when I first began managing some of my fellow faculty members that all of my professional relationships would change. I didn’t believe them. Or rather, I believed that that could happen, but I thought it all depended on how I carried myself. If I still treated people the same way, we would have the same relationship. But that wasn’t true. The same words had different meaning when they came from “the boss.” I anticipated that I would have to stop making fun of my close friends, and that they would probably make fun of me less, at least when I was around. But I didn’t get that everything I said and didn’t say would be scrutinized for possible threats. I didn’t realize that the (honestly, rather limited) power I had in this new position meant that people I had known for years were going to have to learn to trust me in this new role, and that without that trust they honestly would not be able to understand me the same way any more.

Here’s where Kant really got me into trouble. I kept trying to give people information and let them make their own decision rather than manipulating them into what I thought was the right decision, whether on my terms or what I took for their own. And this had worked for me as a teacher and as a colleague. I think one of the reasons I got elected to an administrative position in the first place was that people found me collegial in precisely this way. But when I did the same thing as a manager, people were confused. I believe that some thought I was trying hardest to manipulate them when I was trying hardest not to. It took me a while to hear how they must be hearing me when I said things like, “That decision needs to be yours, and I respect whatever decision you make.” I imagine that if you’re in the certain percentage of the population that has not had a relationship with a supervisor like the kind I was inviting, such statements seem particularly sinister.

If I were starting administration all over again, I would pay more attention to earning people’s trust from the beginning. You’re never going to get everyone – disliking the boss is just too fun and too well ingrained at most institutions, often for good reason. But parenting has hammered in how essential it is to earn trust at the outset. Once you’ve got it, even difficult conversations become easier. And if you don’t have it, even exchanges you think will be easy can be fraught.

So that’s why I encourage Rosebud to let his Kantianism go just this once and to risk feeling a little manipulative in an attempt to build trust with his co-worker. And that’s also why I so appreciate it when Wode Toad begins by saying, “Bless your heart,” even when he continues with, “You’re as dumb as a bag of hammers, aren’t you?” It tells me that my amphibian overlord cares for me and wants me to understand that. I’m guessing that he reads a lot of Aristotle.

Picture credit: Robert Shields, Wikicommons.

What Women’s Underwear Can Teach Us about Knowledge and Evidence

Hello, my name is Brandon and I’ll be taking care of you here at the Bistro this evening. Thanks to Chef Robert for giving me this gig, and I hope I last long enough to earn my own doodle.

Ask me about our bottomless cup of despair

When I considered what to serve for my first post, the answer came to me quickly. It’s one of my favorite stories, involves a dear and sadly deceased friend, and teaches an important philosophical lesson about as memorably as one could hope. Unfortunately, the first title that occurred to me was “The Parable of the Panties,” which I thought might be working a little blue for my first shift, and could also lead to some amusingly disappointed Google searches. But the present title quickly took its place, so as soon as I locate the croutons and dribble a little balsamic vinegar on top, your appetizer will be right out.

Philosopher

My buddy Joseph Yeh died twelve years ago and I’m still mad about it. That’s not necessarily the most spiritual attitude to adopt, but most days I prefer it to my sadness over his loss. It was such an absurd way to go: jumping off a boat to take a swim, forgetting to set the anchor, and failing to make it to the nearest island after the boat blew away. After we heard the news, some of us took dark comfort in our realization that of all of our friends, Joe was easily the one most likely to fake his own death. Some days I honor Joe’s memory by imagining him somewhere in Central America, working undercover and waiting for the day he can step back into our lives right where he left off, starting by saying, “Funny story.” (In researching this story I learned that this fantasy is no longer operative.)

That would be the right way to begin, because Joe’s life was one funny story after another. He did not just tell them, he lived them. Many were merely delightful trifles. I’ll never forget wandering into the hall that held our college swimming pool and finding Joe and his friend Phil taking turns walking to the end of the diving board, delivering a rhyming couplet, then jumping in. After a minute or so of this I caught Joe’s eye. He just said, “Poetry in motion,” as if that explained everything, then dove in again. This sort of thing happened every day when that man was around.

Other stories had a deeper resonance. My favorite illustrates an important philosophical question: What counts as knowledge? One famous answer is that you know something when you have a justified true belief.

The main point of this definition is that it is not enough for your belief to be true for it to count as knowledge. You must also have adequate evidence. This is important because if this definition is right, then we know much less than we often say we know. We often use the phrase “I know” as if it were synonymous with “I’m positive.” But Philosophers would like you to keep in mind that your certainty is not in and of itself proof, even if it feels that way. (This is a good example of why Philosophers get invited to so few parties.) To test this definition we need an example – preferably a memorable one – featuring a true belief that seems to be justified but actually is not. That’s where Joe Yeh’s story comes in.

One year in graduate school Joe dated a woman I never had the opportunity to meet. Things became strained between them for a period without quite reaching the breaking point. During this time Joe had a brief affair. He felt bad about it, but apparently not bad enough to inform his girlfriend. Life went on as before, or so he thought.

Coincidentally, around the same time Joe helped organize and run a conference. Since the speakers were mostly other graduate students from out of town, the organizers all offered to provide them rooms if they had any available. Joe spent the night at his girlfriend’s, giving up his own bedroom for an incoming speaker who happened to be female. Later that week, Joe found a pair of women’s underwear in his room. It was the same brand and color that his girlfriend preferred, so he put it in the basket with other pieces of her laundry. Only much later would he find out that this underwear was not his girlfriend’s size.

Soon thereafter the semester ended and Joe and his girlfriend went their separate ways for the summer. She stayed with her family in the Seattle area, and shortly before the fall semester began Joe flew out for a visit. They got on a ferry to the island where her parents lived, at which point Joe’s girlfriend asked him if he had had an affair the previous spring. There was a brief pause during which Joe decided to confess. Before he could answer, however, she added that she knew he had because she had found the other woman’s underwear in her laundry pile at his place.

PH2009042302069.jpg (650×345)

There are few prettier places in the world for an argument.

Joe laughed, which was the wrong reaction. Their relationship probably couldn’t have been salvaged at that point, as hinted at by the fact that his girlfriend waited until he had flown across the country and gotten on the ferry to her parent’s house before making her accusation. Still, if Joe had any chance of earning her forgiveness, he likely lost it with that laugh. But without defending any of his actions in this whole affair, I will say that I understand and sympathize with his laughter. Because you don’t expect your mate, in the process of charging you with having an affair, to present you with a classic philosophical conundrum. But that’s what happened.

I used to tell this story in my classes. There were usually a couple of people who couldn’t get past the word “panties,” which is one of the reasons I’ve largely avoided it here. But most others appreciated the problem. “Did she know he had an affair?” I would ask them. Almost without exception a majority would say, often fervently, that she did. She believed that he had an affair and he had, so that counted as knowledge. But the only proof she offered – or so Joe said in his anecdote, and so I assume for the sake of argument – was the pair of underwear that belonged to the graduate student speaker, with whom Joe did not have any inappropriate contact. Should we really count his girlfriend’s belief as knowledge, then?

Consider another example. As the cliché says, even a broken clock is right twice a day. But imagine that your clock is stuck on noon. A friend calls and asks you what time it is. You say that it’s noon, which in fact it is. Your friend says, “Are you sure?” You answer, “I know it is. I’m looking right at the clock.” Do you really know what time it was, or was that just a lucky guess?

Fall backward.

Or take the very different case of religious faith. Long ago I traveled to Philadelphia with a friend to stay with one of his friends, and we all met a young doctor who worked in an inner-city hospital that dealt with a high number of violent assaults. I remember him saying in a matter-of-fact tone that the area where he worked had a significantly higher homicide rate than Israel-Palestine, which in the early 90s was a striking claim. At some point after dinner the conversation took a philosophical turn when I wasn’t looking, and the doctor drew my attention when he suddenly beat his fist on the wooden table and shouted, “I know there’s a God.” It was a powerful claim, not least for the context he had developed all night with a stream of stories about the horrors he confronted every time he went to work. I remember the long drive back to Kentucky, looking out the window and wondering if that – whatever it had been – counted as knowledge, and if what that had been was conviction. (A couple of years later I would read the book On Certainty, which dealt with related issues in ways I found mesmerizing, which led me to declare Philosophy as my fourth and final major. But that’s another story.)

“Call me in the morning.”

Finally, imagine reversing the situation, so that instead of an unjustified true belief we’re dealing with a justified false belief. Supposedly, the Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein attended a party one time.

Yes, I would love to hear more about your opinions.

I say supposedly, because it stretches credulity a bit already to imagine that cranky Viennese at any sort of social gathering, but let’s use our imaginations. Another attendee began ridiculing the pre-Copernicans who held the mistaken belief that the sun revolved around the earth rather than the other way around. “Wasn’t that positively stupid, thinking the sun went around the earth?” this man made the mistake of asking Wittgenstein, who replied with his standard icy stare, saying, “Yes. But I wonder what it would have looked like if it did.” Of course the sun would appear much the same in that case, like a golden chariot racing across the sky, and if the courses of the stars would seem different in a Ptolemaic universe, the alterations would be subtle enough to be missed even by most close observers. In other words, belief in geocentrism was justified by the available evidence. It merely had the misfortune of also being wrong, although it took Copernicus to prove it. So did the pre-Copernicans know that the sun revolved around the earth? It’s difficult to say that they did. But no more difficult than finding yourself accused by your girlfriend of cheating while taking a ferry across Puget Sound.

Who’s orbiting whom?

That’s today’s meal. If you saved room for desert, speak up and I’ll tell you about the time I recounted this story for a room full of police officers, who decided that the story was about me, not Joe, and refused to allow me to retract my “confession.” Thanks again to Robert for letting me serve you, and to Joseph Yeh for all the laughs and insights. Don’t forget to tip your wait staff, and please – don’t try the veal. Veal is evil.

Photo credits: N/A, Augusta Chronicle, Mark Parisi, N/A, Seattle’s Convention and Visitors Bureau, Salvador Dali, Titan, uncertain, Hameed at Deviant Art.